Ambassador Jehangir Karamat at Brookings Institution

December 15, 2004

Transcript of Q&A Session

MR. COHEN: General Karamat, thank you very much for agreeing to make this your first public address in the United States and also for, I think, your articulate and eloquent statement of Pakistan's role in the world today and especially Pakistan's relationship with the United States. I think if I were writing my book right now, I'd have to change a few things. But we can talk about that in the next session, when we discuss my book.

We have time for some questions and answers. Please raise your hand and identify yourself and the young women with the microphones will track you down.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Edward Cowan. I'm an independent writer and editor.
Mr. Ambassador, first, thank you for coming to speak to us today. We're happy to hear what you have to say. I'd like to ask a question that I think is probably the first thought on the minds of many Americans when they think about Pakistan, and that is Osama bin Laden. Why has not Pakistan found him by now? Is it a lack of resources, a lack of political will, fear of antagonism from the people who live in the region where he is presumed to be hiding out? What is the problem?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: The question should have been, Why hasn't the U.S. and Pakistan found him so far? Because ever since the U.S. operations in Afghanistan supported by Pakistan, and somehow not only Osama but also Mollah Omar, both ride off into the sunset and are never seen again. That's where we started from. After that, I won't take you through the whole thing, but the areas have been combed on the Pakistan side with a large number of troops. The same has been done by U.S. and Afghan forces on the Afghan side. There's never been a sighting. There's never been specific information. Interrogations have been carried out of a large number of people, and you don't have any real lead. I think the reason, perhaps, is, one, difficulty of the terrain; two, perhaps, if he is not dead, his presence is in a very remote area somewhere in the north, which is a very difficult and very remote area. He's either confined to a compound or some kind of area, not moving around much, and surrounded by people who are very loyal to him. Now, that's what I can think of. I haven't the foggiest idea where he is.

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible.] Thank you for your comments about our outsourcing of our al Qaeda problem to you.

QUESTIONER: I'm Christine Fair from USIP. Watching the public opinion polls in Pakistan and the United States raises a number of questions. As you know, our operations in Afghanistan, the preposterous situation that we're in in Iraq, and a lot of other policies have generated a lot of anti-U.S. sentiment within Pakistan. So to what extent has this domestic attitude in Pakistan constrained the Musharraf government? And what sort of advice would you have for the United States in terms of managing the perception of America within Pakistan? You talked a lot about managing Pakistan's perception here, but we've got the opposite mirror problem in Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Frankly, I think as the U.S. moves toward some kind of conclusions in Afghanistan, the elections there have gone well. That has had good blow-back in Pakistan. As they're moving toward selecting cabinet members, the recent move by President Karzai to sort of differentiate between the bad and the good Taliban and try to bring the good ones into the fold, I think, all this is having an effect. Public opinion is changing on that. And I think as you reach a conclusion and make further progress in Afghanistan with rebuilding activities, government control, and so on, it will change further.

The perception of U.S. in Pakistan, you know, it depends on who you talk to. The people who understand what is going on in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, know that we are perhaps following policies which are extremely important for us and we have opted for directions to which there is no alternative at the moment. So that is understood.

But to answer your question, I would say that once we have good trade arrangements coming in, free trade agreement or trade and investment framework, once we have bilateral investment initiative with the U.S., and the U.S. comes in on the economic and social sector, where things work to reduce poverty and directly impact the common man, I think public opinion will change very rapidly.

QUESTIONER: Mike Miyazawa with The Miyazawa Report. My question is about your relationship with the United States. Soon after the withdrawal of Soviet troops out of Afghanistan back in 1989, the United States decided to use the Pressler amendment not only to discontinue all the aid, but also refused for several years to return hundreds of millions of dollars Pakistan had paid to the United States to buy U.S.-made jet fighters. And in 1998, the United States used the Glenn amendment to impose additional sanctions. But everything changed after 9/11 and most of the sanctions have been lifted.

So it appears to me that a chaotic and unstable Afghanistan works in your favor as far as your relationship with the United States is concerned. My question is if Osama bin Laden is captured or killed and stability prevails throughout Afghanistan, do you think U.S. aid and cooperation will continue, or it will be discontinued and sanctions will resume?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: That's something which bothers a lot of people in Pakistan. But I didn't want to go into the historical aspect. But over the years that we have worked with the U.S., it has been a learning process. Believe me.

[Laughter.]

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: The recently declassified White House documents on the relationship in the '50s, when the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. was very strongly oriented toward the Cold War, now bring out that at that time, Pakistan was getting state-of-the-art equipment from the United States. In fact, many of the army's branches which are now stable and progressing were raised with U.S.-support at that time, were started with U.S. support at that time. Now, when you read those documents, you find the Americans saying "we gave all this equipment to Pakistan not to go to war with India but to help in the Cold War with the United States”. Yet we went into the '65 war because Pakistan had a different perception. So there were different perceptions. Something that the U.S. was doing in its own interest, they thought in Pakistan that this is for us and we can do what we like. So we transited from that into, I think, a better understanding.

Also, I think we've learned a lot--I'm not being critical, but learned a lot on the sort of convoluted process that things follow here in the United States, through the Congress and through various laws that are invoked at particular times. And that gives us an understanding of where the Pressler amendment and the Glenn/Symington amendment and all these things come from.

Having said that--and Strobe used to be the one pressuring us all the time--we had to do certain things; we did those things, because there was our national security at stake. So U.S. pressure or no pressure, what had to be done was done. And of course we faced the consequences. But I think I might say that so much has been learned by us, and hopefully the U.S. also has a sense of our security compulsions, that I don't see that sort of drastic thing happening again--and I think so because, this time, it's not a zero-sum relationship and it doesn't have a Soviet or other orientation. It is bilateral relations which stand on their own with Pakistan and with India, and not to the exclusion of either. So that's why I see a future in this relationship.

QUESTIONER: I'm Barry Jacobs from the Asia and Pacific Rim Institute of the American Jewish Committee. General Musharraf, before he visited President Bush in Crawford, Texas, about a year and a half ago, threw out the prospect of Pakistan perhaps recognizing the State of Israel. Now that there is movement--we hope--in the peace process, under what circumstances, or what would be the conditions for Pakistan to formally acknowledge and establish a relationship with Israel?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Yes. You know, there is a stance that Pakistan has on this issue. It's not so much to do with Pakistan-Israel as it has to do with the whole Israel-Palestine thing. And I think to really get a sense of where it's going and what could happen, one, you'll have to understand the public opinion and the way it has to be turned around if ever this is going to happen; and secondly, I think the Israel-Palestine thing has to move on a more positive track than it has had so far, and then maybe this could be considered.

QUESTIONER: Marvin Kalb with the Shorenstein Center at Harvard. Mr. Ambassador, could you help us better understand the role that Dr. Khan played in either selling or sending nuclear materials to Libya, North Korea? And specifically, was there any material sent to Iran, and was there any relationship with the Pakistani government?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: I think this whole thing has been discussed and so much written on it in the media. But on the specifics that you asked, taking your last point first, there was no government sanction, approval, or any kind of government connection with what went on. That's one. The other is, I think the U.S. has had enormous access to everything in Libya. The same is not the case with North Korea and Iran, because I don't think you have that kind of access there.

I think it was the existence of an international network which involved a number of countries, many areas, many people, and that Dr. Khan was perhaps plugged into that network to get what was required and to do what he did. I think domestically Pakistan has resolved that problem; carried out an investigation, settled it domestically. But as for the international network, I think, work has to be done on that to discover exactly what is in Iran or what went into Iran and to discover what happened with North Korea.

And I think that is an ongoing process which is now picking up as the focus shifts to the international network.

QUESTIONER: Lena Avani [sp] with National Public Radio. What are the prospects for the United States selling F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan? And when President Musharraf was here week before last, did he receive any indications from President Bush that this is actually going to happen?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: If he did, he hasn't told anybody. But having said that, I think it would be a mistake in our relationship with the U.S. to lock onto a particular item and make it sort of a focal point for everything in our relationship. I would say that the U.S. will make its own assessment of Pakistan's defense requirements and capability that they want Pakistan to have. I would very much hope that there is convergence on this assessment between what the U.S. thinks and what we think. And if a high-tech aircraft fits into that, we would be very interested.

QUESTIONER: Jiten Donat [ph], [inaudible] University. Mr. Ambassador, we heard you talk about, in the context of the eastern borders of Pakistan, U.N. presence. We also heard the word "flexibility." Some time ago, President Musharraf had indicated that Pakistan was willing to look at other options than plebiscite and, presumably, the old U.N. resolutions. How does your statement square with what he had said earlier? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: I think that ties in with that. Not only did he say that we could look at options, but he even offered an option quite recently, which wasn't really seriously considered anywhere. I think a lot of these options--before we actually decide to veer away from stated positions, a lot of these options need to be debated, discussed, brought on the table. And it's only then that you can say that, okay, we can move here, we can move there. So I think when he talks of flexibility, he's talking about it in the sense of looking at options, examining them, and discussing them--bilaterally and domestically.

QUESTIONER: Joel Wishingrad, World Media Reports, WMR News.
What is your ongoing negotiations with India concerning Kashmir, and when will both countries--being yourselves as well as they--begin to put infrastructure monies into commercial type ventures as well as the infrastructure that you need throughout your country? And what are those prospects?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: India, Pakistan have opted for a composite dialogue, which is in progress. It's moving ahead by fits and starts. There is some, I think, disappointment on the Pakistan side that perhaps the element of reciprocity in the talks is not being fully brought in, which I think is necessary for these talks to move forward. But having said that, I think they cover a wide range of subjects, and they are, from the subcontinent's standards, progressing well.

On the commercial ventures, the very fact that these talks are continuing and showing the potential of getting institutionalized into some kind of peace process, it's a great achievement in the subcontinent. And on the commercial ventures, I would say that there is legal trade between India and Pakistan. I think about 86 items, have been added to the list recently to increase the scope of the trade. I also know that there's an illegal trade between India and Pakistan which is many times more than the legal trade, and perhaps that has the potential of being brought into the legal trade to at least regularize it.

There is talk of joint ventures--high profile, high impact joint ventures--like energy pipelines coming in and going through Pakistan into India. There are enormous requirements of energy in India as well as in Pakistan. So those are there. I think they're being discussed. Trade agreements are being discussed. The whole SAARC framework is being strengthened and more subjects brought in, including counterterrorism. So a lot is happening.

It's difficult to say when something will definitely happen. But I would say everything seems to be pointing both countries in the right direction. And I hope they continue to follow that direction.

MR. COHEN: We have time for one more question. Ambassador Karamat has another appointment.

QUESTIONER: Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers.
As a nuclear power, do you think Pakistan has any significant difference of opinion with the United States in the responsibilities that entails. And also, do you see Pakistan having any special responsibility to Muslim nations that don't have nuclear power?

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: As far as the United States is concerned, of course, there was a big difference of opinion before the nuclear tests and when Pakistan's program was under development. We were under a lot of pressure. There were demands that we terminate, roll back, limit; various nuances to those demands. But after that, and especially after this proliferation episode, I think the U.S. and Pakistan are talking to each other on the subject. There is convergence. Pakistan has indicated its preference or agreement to be part of all regimes that will bring proliferation under control export controls and so on. So I don't see any major difference of opinion there, except that the U.S. would like to see peace on the subcontinent so that there is no possibility of nuclear exchange or even conflict that could lead to nuclear exchange. So on that, Pakistan is totally with the U.S. We don't want it either. I don't think India would want it either.

So I would say there is convergence. There is no difference of opinion on the direction that it should take from now on. The past, of course, is something different.
You had another part to that question.

QUESTIONER: Regarding other Muslim nations.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Yeah, other Muslim nations. Well, this is a strategic asset which is Pakistani. It is under Pakistan's control. And I don't think Pakistan or any other country would want to share it or even indicate that it has got any other purpose except for Pakistan's security.

MR. COHEN: Let me thank Ambassador Karamat for joining us. This is his first appearance in Washington. You know, among other things, I'm a military historian and I've met many generals, mostly retired, in the past. When I met then-General Karamat, when he was army chief in Pakistan, I was impressed by his breadth of his understanding of the issues and problems facing Pakistan and the region. And I thought to myself, here's a general who really could fit into any army in the world and do well. Because he not only understood the military professional aspects of these issues, but the social and political context in which his army operated.

I'm very pleased that you've now changed the nature of your public service. You've become an ambassador, and I think you'll be a very effective one. Let me extend an invitation now, when you leave your ambassadorship to come back to Brookings. Because we'd like to have you back here again. With that, let me thank you again for joining us.

AMBASSADOR KARAMAT: Thank you very much.