Ambassador Qazi's address at Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference
(from June 21-22, 2004)

Thank you for your invitation to participate in this important Conference inaugurating public discussions on the Carnegie draft report on “Universal Compliance: A strategy for Nuclear Security.”

This particular section has been provocatively entitled “the Pakistan Network”, and I am sufficiently provoked to begin my presentation by recording my serious objection to referring to the nuclear segment of the international arms bazaar as the Pakistani network.

At no time has any Government of Pakistan, past or present, been involved in setting up such a network. Although Dr. A.Q. Khan is a Pakistani he acted without any governmental authority – indeed he acted to the great embarrassment of the government of Pakistan. Moreover, the nuclear component and designs bazaar predates A.Q. Khan. Its prime constituents moreover have been western companies and individuals belonging to NPT member countries. One might just as well name this Wal- Mart after these countries.

In retrospect there was indeed a lack of effective oversight regarding Dr. A.Q. Khan’s activities outside Pakistan. He was granted a high degree of autonomy and authority to enable him to develop a nuclear weapons capability in response to India’s nuclear test of 1974 and its nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, Dr. A.Q. Khan abused his position of trust and responsibility. We had our suspicions. But we had no compelling evidence to confront him. Nevertheless, we removed him from the KRL in 2001. Nor did the US or any other country have compelling evidence until October of last year.

As soon as we received compelling new evidence we took swift action. We launched our investigations. So did the IAEA. We determined that some transfers from Pakistan were carried out under the direct orders and supervision of Dr. A.Q. khan in his individual capacity. These transfers to Iran, and Libya were limited to centrifuge enrichment including drawings, sketches, technical data, some components, etc. However, most of the new equipment did not originate from Pakistan. It was manufactured by a component production facility established in another country with the whole process overseen by western experts. This is, of course, not to minimize the shortcomings in our own oversight of Dr. A.Q. Khan.

But the actual scale of the nuclear proliferation network is almost global in extent of which of centrifuge enrichment technology is just one part. Equipment and technology pertaining to other aspects of the Libyan and Iranian programs were procured from western sources. So dismantling and ensuring against the reconstitution of the nuclear proliferation network is a common enterprise which is not assisted by attempts to put Pakistan in the dock.

Pakistan has extended its cooperation to the IAEA with regard to verifying the completeness of the Libyan and Iranian declarations. Similarly, we have facilitated the task of the IAEA to identify various players on the nuclear black market. Information obtained from A.Q. Khan has been valuable in this regard and this information may not have been available had we not reached a plea bargain arrangement with him whereby in return for his confession and continued cooperation he was granted a conditional pardon.

I might add that as a non-signatory to the NPT Pakistan’s own obligations towards the IAEA stern from its Item/Facility specific Safeguards Agreement on which it has an excellent record of compliance. Nor is Pakistan under any investigation by the IAEA for any violation of its international obligations. Accordingly, our cooperation with the IAEA is entirely voluntary. Of course, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, we accept international norms and on that basis have been cooperating with the IAEA. We also voted for the recently adopted UN Security Council resolution 1540 despite our reservations that the Security Council is not an appropriate body to deal with the issue of non-proliferation. It is our view that treaty regimes are more equitable and systemic in nature. Instead of political aspects they rely more on the technological aspects and issues and as a result they tend to provide better solutions.

The IAEA DG has acknowledged the voluntary cooperation extended by Pakistan and has called on all other concerned states to similarly cooperate with the Agency. Pakistan acted swiftly against A.Q. Khan. He remains under supervision and investigation. The value of the information we continue to obtain from him has been acknowledged. The network associated with him has been rolled up. A.Q. Khan’s associates have been identified and are being investigated. The network will hopefully not be reconstituted. But to ensure this other countries whose nationals were involved in proliferation activities need to take similar actions – especially those countries that are members of the NPT and the NSG.

Pakistan is in the process of adopting a new legal regime on export controls in line with international standards. A “Draft Bill on Export Control of Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems – 2004” was approved by the Cabinet on May 5, 2004. On June 5, the bill was tabled in the National Assembly for ratification. The bill establishes an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of the legislation which has wide jurisdiction covering export control lists and catch all provisions, licensing and record keeping provisions, prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies, penal provisions, etc. Pakistan has an effective Export Control structure and one of the most comprehensive lists of controlled items.

Pakistan established an effective Command and Control structure in February 2002. The Strategic Command Organization (SCO) comprises a National Command Authority (NCA), a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and a Strategic Forces Command (SFC). There has been no diversion of strategic assets or materials under the jurisdiction the SCO. The NCA is the apex decision making body with the President as its Chairman and the Prime Minister its Vice Chairman. The Foreign Minister heads the Employment Control Committee (ECC) which formulates policy and guidelines for an effective command and control system and assures that strategic decisions are not based on inaccurate information. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) acts as the Secretariat for the NCA. It prepares policy options and has responsibility for personnel dependability. The Government of Pakistan is cooperating with the IAEA to develop best practices in custodial controls, export controls, personnel reliability programs, etc. Accordingly, it is quite unjustified to cite the unfortunate case of A.Q. Khan’s misdeeds which pertained to setting up a proliferation network outside Pakistan as a reason to cast doubt on the security of Pakistan’s strategic assets. People in the know know the truth.

The Carnegie strategy for Nuclear Security in South Asia recommends, among other things, encouraging India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute and to promote stable conventional force balances in the region. In the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the UN Security Council resolution 1172 called on both countries to resolve “root causes of tension” between them, and specifically referred to the Kashmir dispute. On January 6, this year the two countries issued in Islamabad Joint Statement undertaking to work towards a mutually satisfactory settlement of this long standing dispute that has destroyed the lives of so many innocent people and blighted the prospect of normal relations between India and Pakistan.

We welcome the positive statements of the newly elected government of India and expect that the road map for dialogue will lead to substantive progress towards a principled and mutually satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir dispute. I mention this because the Carnegie report links the possibility of deterrence failure in South Asia to dangerous possibilities emanating from this unresolved dispute. If I were to take issue with the draft report, I would say it in somewhat gratuitously emphasizes the sanctity of the territorial status quo in Kashmir at the expense of the rights and wishes of the Kashmiri people. What Pakistan is aiming for is a peace process that brings about a win-win resolution of the Kashmir dispute in which there are no losers – especially not the people of Kashmir. Such a peace process would not only provide a context for radically improved India-Pakistan relations; it would also provide a positive context for the success of our talks on nuclear CBMs the inaugural round of which has just concluded in New Delhi.